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Exploring Internal Child SexTrafficking
Networks Using Social Network Analysis
1
Eleanor Cockbain, Helen Brayley and Gloria Laycock
Abstract This article explores the potential of social network analysis as a tool in supporting the investigation of
internal child sex trafﬁcking in the UK. In doing so, it uses only data, software, and training already available to UK
police. Data from two major operations are analysed using in-built centrality metrics, designed to measure a network’s
overarching structural properties and identify particularly powerful individuals. This work addresses victim networks
alongside offender networks. The insights generated by SNA inform ideas for targeted interventions based on the
principles of Situational Crime Prevention. These harm-reduction initiatives go beyond traditional enforcement to
cover prevention, disruption, prosecution, etc. This article ends by discussing how SNA can be applied and further
developed by frontline policing, strategic policing, prosecution, and policy and research.
Introduction
Recent decades have seen a shift from reactive
enforcement-led policing towards more proactive
and collaborative approaches (Waters, 2007), like
intelligence-led policing (ILP) and problem-
oriented policing (POP) (Maguire, 1998). When
policing makes ‘much greater and much more sys-
tematic use of information’ (Tilley, 2009, p. 2), new
tools and techniques are required to provide ana-
lytical support at local and national level (Chainey,
2008). Faced with dramatic budget cuts (Dodd,
2010), social network analysis (SNA) offers a valu-
able opportunity to maximize current resources,
without need for additional software or training.
This article forms part of a pair of articles exploring
the application of crime science tools to internal
child sex trafﬁcking: its complement is an analysis
of crime scripting (Brayley et al., 2011).
SNA
According to SNA, ‘individuals are embedded in
thick webs of social relations and interactions’
(Borgatti et al., 2009) which inﬂuence their behav-
iour.Althoughtheterm‘socialnetwork’commonly
evokes images of Facebook or MySpace, it can
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 apply to virtually any human interactions. SNA has
helped explain phenomena as diverse as obesity
(Christakis, 2007), globalization (Grewal, 2008),
HIV (Rothenberg, 1998), and feminism (Philips,
1991).
A network is a set of ‘entities’, usually individ-
uals, organizations, or commodities, connected by
‘links’ (i2, 2010), which symbolize relationships
and interactions. If rearranged structurally, how-
ever,networkswithidenticalcomponentscanfunc-
tion differently (McAndrew, 2000). A particularly
important concept, the focus of much counter-
terrorism SNA (Sageman, 2004; McAllister, 2004;
Pedehzur and Perliger, 2006), is ‘centralization’. A
network’s overall composition lies on a continuum
from loosely dispersed (decentralized) structures to
tightly knit (centralized) concentrations of entities.
The more centralized a network, the less resilient it
is to losing entities: loose terrorist networks can
sustain 70% casualties before collapsing, compared
to just 30% for highly centralized army units
(McAllister, 2004). Understanding a network’s
composition enables interventions to exploit spe-
ciﬁc structural weaknesses.
SNA can also reveal the relative importance of
each entity by analysing power asconferred by links
to other network members, rather than individual
personality traits (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).
This can pinpoint key relationships within criminal
structures as targets for disruption.
Power is quantiﬁed using ‘centrality metrics’:
robust mathematical functions which calculate
scores for each entity based on its position in the
network. These metrics have two main uses. First,
average scores, ranges,
2 and standard deviations
3
indicate how power is distributed across networks,
e.g. whenpower isevenly shared between members,
ranges and standard deviations are usually small.
Second, centrality metrics allow well-connected or
inﬂuential entities to be identiﬁed. By targeting
these ﬁgures, the police stand the best chance of
disrupting or even disintegrating the whole
network.
Most modern SNA software supports the auto-
mated calculation of centrality metrics: once net-
works are built, analysts need only run the metrics
and interpret the results. Nevertheless, SNA is not
completely objective: results are inﬂuenced by de-
cisions on the entities included, types of links used
and metrics applied. These choices depend in turn
on the data available, level of detail required, and
overall aim of the analysis.
Unfortunately, newcomers to SNA may be con-
fused by the lack of standardization in the litera-
ture, e.g. different terminology is used for the same
concepts, and the tendency of material to be either
highly theoretical or extremely technical
(McAndrew, 2000). Neither broad conceptual dis-
cussions nor the intricacies of statistics and com-
puter science are of much practical use in policing.
Occasional good introductions to SNA exist (e.g.
Scott, 2000), but these are quite generic and none
focuses on law enforcement.
Police have enjoyed a long history of mapping
connections between actors and commodities
involved in crime (Borgatti et al., 2009), particu-
larlyorganizedcrime, inline withinitiatives such as
Organized Crime Group (OCG) mapping.
Generally, networks are built with data from
on-going investigations and focus on offenders.
The hand-drawn network charts once found on
the walls of operation rooms have given way to
their computerized equivalent. All UK police
forces now use i2 Analyst’s Notebook, a dedicated
SNA software package with in-built centrality met-
rics, used by private security ﬁrms and law enforce-
ment across the world, including America’s FBI
(Wakeﬁeld, 2003). Analysts regularly present net-
work charts in court to demonstrate offending
groups’ structures. As the British police have
2 Range is the difference between minimum and maximum scores in a set: e.g. if the highest score is 70 and the lowest 10, the
range is 60.
3 Standard deviation measures the level of variation between entities’ scores (see Rowntree, 2000).
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 already embraced i2’s network visualization cap-
acity, the next step is to fully exploit its analytical
potential. This article will demonstrate how SNA
can use existing police data, software, and capabil-
ities to shed light on an under-researched crime
type and inform novel intervention ideas.
Situational crime prevention
Beyond enforcement alone, SNA can inform tar-
geted interventions across diverse areas including
detection, investigation, disruption, prosecution,
prevention, and education. Most suggestions
given here draw on Situational Crime Prevention
(SCP), a theory which has proved increasingly at-
tractive to UK police (Clarke, 1997). It was long
assumed that criminality was somehow ingrained,
whereas SCP sees criminals as rational decision
makers who weigh-up costs and beneﬁts before of-
fending (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). According to
SCP, most crime is opportunistic, requiring three
factors to coincide (Cohen and Felson, 1979):
 willing offender;
 suitable target or victim; and
 absent guardian(s).
SCP aims simply to create conditions unfavourable
to crime by doing one of ﬁve things (Clarke, 1997;
Clarke and Eck, 2003):
 increasing perceived effort;
 increasing perceived risks;
 reducing rewards;
 removing excuses; and
 reducing provocations.
As conditions change, so too does the prospective
criminal’s cost-beneﬁt analysis. Effective SCP can
deter crimes by shifting the balance against the
criminal act, often through simple and intuitive
interventions addressing speciﬁc situational
conditions. The main argument against SCP is
displacement: crime is not prevented but pushed
elsewhere. Yet, there is little empirical support for
displacement and where proven it has been at low
levels only (Guerette and Bowers, 2009).
Internal child sex trafficking
Under Section 58 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
(OPSI, 2003), it is illegal to arrange or facilitate the
movement of someone within the UK with the
intent to exploit them sexually. This offence, in-
ternal sex trafﬁcking, carries a maximum custodial
sentence of 14 years (SGC, 2007). What we call
ICST is the subset involving UK children (aged
under 18 years). We exclude internationally traf-
ﬁcked children who are subsequently trafﬁcked in-
ternally since their exploitation has a different
proﬁle.Since awarenessis lowandICSToften over-
laps with better-understood offences (rape, child
pornography, false imprisonment, etc.), it is rarely
reported or recorded as internal sex trafﬁcking.
Consequently, ofﬁcial statistics on prevalence are
misleading (CRIN, 2001).
A recent study into internal and international
child trafﬁcking victims in the UK found that a
ﬁfth of all victims were British, the second largest
nationalityin thesample (CEOP, 2009).Sincethere
is no evidence that British children are trafﬁcked
except for sex, these cases probably represent
ICST. Fieldworkers describe a hidden but wide-
spread problem with far-reaching implications.
Alongsidetraumatovictimscoststosocietyinclude
strains on the health care, beneﬁt and criminal just-
ice systems and community tensions. When autho-
rities are perceived as negligent, litigation is an
additional risk: parents of ICST victims attempted
to sue Lancashire police in 2007,
4 while a victim of
the equivalent crime in Holland successfully
claimed E74,000 from her school (Dutch
National Rapporteur, 2009). The ﬁrst major
police investigation into ICST was launched in
2009 and several operations have followed.
4 Interview with police, March 2010.
146 Policing Article E. Cockbain et al.
 
a
t
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
o
n
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
8
,
 
2
0
1
1
p
o
l
i
c
i
n
g
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Contrary to stereotypes of sinister paedophile
rings, most child sex offenders act alone (Wortley
and Smallbone, 2006). Smallbone and Wortley
(2000, 2001) found that only 4% were involved in
anorganizednetworkand92%hadnocontact with
otheroffenderspriortoarrest.TheICSToperations
considered here feature multiple victims and of-
fenders, suggesting ICST is more networked than
most child sex abuse and thus well-suited to SNA.
Data
Our study covers 25 offenders and 36 victims in
total, drawn from two major police investigations:
Operations X and Y. The data used were typical of
police investigations:
 victim records of video interviews (ROVIs);
 offender ROVIs;
 MG5 case summaries
5;
 text messages and video footage from offend-
ers’ and victims’ mobile telephones;
 formal charge list (Operation X); and
 court visits (Operation X).
Creating ICST networks
We created two networks per operation: one each
for victims and offenders. By focusing on a single
type of character, we could run centrality metrics
comparing homogenous groups, i.e. offenders with
offenders and victims with victims. To ensure this,
we also excluded third-party actors, e.g. facilitators,
and ICST-related commodities, e.g. properties or
cars. As only charged offenders and testifying vic-
tims qualiﬁed for inclusion, our numbers are con-
servative. Interested in what could be achieved with
existing police resources, we used their standard
software, i2 Analyst’s Notebook (version 8).
For clarity, our key terms are deﬁned in Table 1
above. With no standard set of links, we created
ours based on the broad social bonds in our data.
These were: relative; colleague/classmate; neigh-
bour; friend; associate; and acquaintance. These
six links cover all known ties but are not mutually
exclusive, so two entities could be relatives and
friends, for example. To prevent centrality scores
being skewed by multiple links, we allowed only
one link between any connected pair. We manually
prioritized the link we believed to be the strongest
or ﬁrst, e.g. being related predates friendship. It was
not always obvious from the data if entities, par-
ticularly offenders, were friends or simply knew
each other. To ensure consistency, we created clas-
siﬁcation rules for a spectrum from acquaintance,
through associate to friend. Table 2 summarizes
these and other rules. Ideally, links are colour-
coded to facilitate pattern-recognition.
On each network we ran three common central-
ity metrics: degree; closeness; and betweenness,
deﬁned below (i2, 2010 unless otherwise stated).
We calculated individual entities’ scores from 0
(low) to 100 (high) and descriptive statistics
(mean, range, etc.) for each network.
Degree
This is based on an entity’s direct links to others.
Degree is relative to the size of the network: an
entity with ﬁve links in a network of seven scores
morehighly than one with ﬁve links in a network of
100. High scores indicate well-connectedness.
Closeness
This is based on the shortest paths (‘geodesics’)
from an entity to all others. High scores indicate
ability to access other actors independently and
quickly transmit/receive information and other
commodities.
Betweenness
This is based on how often an entity appears on
geodesics between other pairs of entities. High
scores indicate ‘gatekeepers’, who control ﬂows
5 Formal case summaries prepared by police for the Crown Prosecution Service (Moreno and Hughes, 2008).
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 between different parts of the network (Perer and
Shneiderman, 2006). As gatekeepers often link
otherwise unconnected clusters (Rowley, 1997),
their elimination can cause network disintegration.
We applied these three complementary metrics
(Freeman, 1979) to ensure a picture as balanced
and comprehensive as possible. Scores on a single
metric can mislead (Scott, 2000). A powerful gang
leader, for example, might be linked directly onlyto
a few (albeit inﬂuential) individuals and therefore
score lowly on degree. In simple structures, entities
often have similar scores across different metrics
(‘co-variance’). When scores diverge, as is
common in complex networks, this suggests an en-
tity’s position is advantageous in some respects, but
not in others (Christakis and Fowler, 2007).
As a simple visual aid, we re-sized entities in
proportion to number of links (degree), making
well-connected entities immediately recognizable.
As re-sizing is only relative to others in the
same network, no cross-network comparisons
should be considered. For anonymity, we replaced
entities’ names with randomly allocated letters:
Operation X’s offenders are A*–N* and victims
a*–y* and Operation Y’s offenders are A–K and
victims a–k.
Considerations
Before presenting our networks, we should empha-
size a few considerations:
 Results can open up new perspectives and in-
dicate certain solutions may be effective, but
they cannot give the deﬁnitive ‘right answer’.
 SNA compresses voluminous information to
produce concise diagrams and metric scores,
but cannot replace the comprehensive under-
standing of an operation.
 In the process of data mining, analysts will in-
variably discover material which, although not
directly relevant to building networks, may
Table 2: Rules and symbols for links
Category Rules
Friend Friend is a stronger link than both associate and acquaintance. Labelled friend if socializing is regular
or friendship is admitted.
Associate Associate is a stronger link than acquaintance but weaker than friend. Labelled associate if seen to-
gether multiple times.
Acquaintance Acquaintance is a weaker link than both friend and associate. Labelled acquaintance if seen together
once or twice.
Relative All relatives are believed to be at least acquaintance, if not associates or friends.
Colleague or classmate All colleagues/classmates are believed to be at least acquaintances, if not associates or friends.
Neighbour All neighbours are believed to be at least acquaintances, if not associates or friends.
Table 1: Components of a network
Term Deﬁnition
Entity Component unit of a network, e.g. individual, organization, or commodity.
Link Connection of some sort between two entities, e.g. kinship, communication, or the ﬂow of goods.
Path A route from one entity to another, via intermediate entities if necessary.
Length The number of links in a path.
Geodesic The shortest available path between A and B.
148 Policing Article E. Cockbain et al.
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 help contextualize or strengthen SNA ﬁndings.
Consequentially,thediscussionbelowincludes
references to interview data which comple-
ments or supports our SNA-based ﬁndings.
We found no instances where interview data
contradicted the SNA’s results.
 Links between entities are difﬁcult to establish
if offenders (or victims) refuse to comment or
lie when questioned. Sometimes gaps can be
ﬁlled from other sources, e.g. surveillance or
recovered telephones.
 As no average centrality scores (‘baselines’)
exist for ICST groups, or any comparable
criminal groups, it can be hard to judge
what is ‘high’ or ‘low’. We assessed scores
relative to all four networks to enable
comparison.
 If someone is identiﬁed early in an investiga-
tion, his/her acquaintances may be more likely
to be discovered, thereby disproportionately
increasing his/her centrality scores. As degree
isespeciallyaffected,complementarymeasures
alleviate misleading results.
 Networks are rarely uncovered in their entir-
ety. This is a limitation of all real-world re-
search and no reason to discount SNA.
 Our networks are speciﬁc to Operations X and
Y: although some commonalities discovered
here may prove typical, future networks will
no doubt have unique features too.
Findings and implications
We discuss below key ﬁndings, together with im-
plications for policing and possible interventions.
These suggestions have not been evaluated and are
intended primarily to stimulate debate and demon-
strate how SNA can generate intervention ideas.
Although our networks feature male perpetrators
and female victims, other gender conﬁgurations
are possible.
Offender networks
Figures 1 and 2 show Operation X and Y’s respect-
ive offender networks.
Only one operation had clear ringleaders
Evidence. Operation X’s network is highly de-
pendent on I* and L*: I* is directly connected to
all co-offenders, L* to all bar one. They are also
proliﬁc abusers, together responsible for 69% of
the operation’s charges. Aware of this double-act,
Operation Y’s police believed that a demographic-
ally similar pair, E and C, were equivalent ringlead-
ers and focused on them accordingly. SNA showed,
however, that neither man had a top score on any
metric. An analysis of degree scores, the clearest
marker of well-connectedness, indicated that
Operation Y’s network was far more decentralized
with a more even spread of power. Although both
networks enjoyed similar mean scores (29.9 for
Operation X, 32.1 for Operation Y), Operation
X’s result was skewed by I* and L*’s extremely
well-connectedness. Operation X’s range (75.0,
compared to 47.1 for Operation Y) and stand-
ard deviation (21.8, compared to 14.4 for
Operation Y) were both high, suggesting real
discrepancy in power distribution between
individual members.
Implications. When a network is centralized
around ringleaders, they represent the ‘glue’ bind-
ing the network and therefore form obvious targets
for removal. As they are well-connected, this news
of their arrest should travel fast and deter others.
Covert surveillance might support such highly tar-
geted enforcement.
SNA can test assumptions, counter personal
biases, review investigative direction, and suggest
appropriate interventions. For Operation Y, it indi-
cated the absence of ringleaders. Consequentially it
wouldbecheaperandmoreeffectivetochipawayat
the whole network. Offenders could be subjected to
pressure(‘increasingperceivedrisk’),e.g.byissuing
Harbourer’s Warnings (Kent County Council,
Exploring Internal Child Sex Trafﬁcking Networks Article Policing 149
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 2009). Those with important ICST-related com-
modities, like cars, might be targeted for driving
offences to revoke their licenses and make cruising
for victims harder (‘increasing perceived effort’).
Pre-existing social networks underpin
offender networks
Evidence. Most offenders scored similarly on
closeness, as emphasized by small ranges (6.9 for
Operation X; 6.5 for Operation Y) and even smaller
standard deviations (2.0 for both). As closeness in-
dicates ready access to co-actors, relatively high
averages (32.7 for Operation X; 29.8 for
Operation Y) indicate tightly knit networks. Links
includesubstantial socialbonds,e.g.relatives,class-
mates, or neighbours. Interview data showed that
much abuse occurred at parties or other social
settings and men often abused en masse. All
things considered, it appears likely that these of-
fender networks formed from wider pre-existing
social networks.
Implications. These networks which developed
independently of and prior to ICST, contrast
sharply with ‘typical’ abuse rings formed explicitly
around shared interests in child sex abuse (Wortley
and Smallbone, 2006). For network members at
least, ICST is socially acceptable: awareness cam-
paigns must emphasize its criminality (‘Removing
excuses’). As offences are not hidden from peers,
there is a clear role for police informants. Emergent
stereotypescharacterizeICSToffendersasPakistani
(BBC, 2004; Bindel, 2007; Reid, 2010; BNP, 2010),
yet this ethnic clustering may primarily reﬂect
Figure 1: Operation X offender network.
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 Figure 2: Operation Y offender network.
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 wider ethnic segregation, i.e. ethnically homogen-
ous social networks.
The ‘loverboy’ stereotype is insufficient
Evidence. ICST offenders are typically character-
ized as ‘loverboys’: young men who groom victims
by feigning romantic interest (CEOP, 2009;
UKHTC, 2010). Some offenders ﬁt the bill, e.g.
Operation X’s I* and L* Operation Y’s E and C.
Yet SNA found that G and K were the top scorers
on all metrics and G was an obvious gatekeeper,
scoring several times above average on between-
ness. Both of these important ﬁgures were older
and neither ﬁt the loverboy proﬁle.
Implications. Offender proﬁling should be trea-
ted carefully: ﬁtting the proﬁle is no guarantee of
power.
Victim networks
Figures 3 and 4 show Operations X and Y’s respect-
ive victim networks.
Victim targeting can be opportunistic
Evidence. In Operation X, four girls (16%) who
were completely unconnected to the rest of the
victim network and seemed therefore to have
been picked up separately. Hidden constellations
of victims might plausibly lie behind these lone vic-
tims, but victim ROVIs showed that many girls
were approached randomly, indicating opportun-
istic targeting. Although Operation Y had no un-
connected girls, they were identiﬁed through one
another (‘snowball sampling’) and therefore inev-
itably linked.
Implications. If offenders target girls randomly,
broad situational interventions are needed to raise
Figure 3: Operation X Victim network.
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 awareness among all young girls (‘increasing per-
ceived effort’). Youth workers could explain that
even if a girl enters an offender’s car willingly,
drinks alcohol, takes drugs, or accepts money, she
is still a victim of crime. This might counter the
sense of complicity fostered by offenders and
encourage reporting (‘increasing perceived risk’).
Alternatively, situational interventions could
target offenders, e.g. installing night-time sprink-
lers in parks where abuse occurs (‘reducing per-
ceived beneﬁt’), or CCTV in pick-up locations
(‘increasing perceived risk’).
‘Girlfriend’ figures aid recruitment
Evidence. Interview data showed that some girls
are heavily groomed and believe they are in ‘rela-
tionships’ with offenders. These ‘girlfriends’ often
recruit friends for abuse to please or pacify their
‘boyfriends’. We identiﬁed three ‘girlfriends’ (a*,
k*, and l*) in Operation X, forming nexus points
around which other victims cluster. The most cen-
tral ‘girlfriend’, however, was Operation Y’s e, who
was directly connected to 80% of victims. Her
betweenness score of 62.1 was twice as high as any
other actor in either operation. This indicated she
was a gatekeeper linking otherwise unconnected
parts of the network.
Implications. Identifying and targeting ‘girl-
friends’,especiallygatekeeperslikee,helpsdissipate
networks and dries up an important recruitment
channel (‘increasing perceived effort’). As victims,
these girls must be treated delicately, but if not
dealt with properly they may become the next-
generation ICST pimps or recruiters. This transi-
tion from victim to perpetrator features in
Figure 4: Operation Y Victim network.
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 international sextrafﬁcking andpresents challenges
for prosecution (Monzini, 2000).
Not all victims are in care
Evidence. Many people believe ICST happens
near exclusively to children in care.
6 Our networks
show that only 8% of Operation X’s victims were in
care together and none of Operation Y’s victims. In
fact, friendship was the primary tie: 56% of
Operation X’s victims and 72% of Operation Y’s
had at least one friend in the victim network.
Implications. Our resultschallenge themyththat
ICST offenders deliberately and exclusively target
girls in care: broader interventions are necessary.
Some girls were in care, however, usually entering
the system post-abuse. Once there, however, their
abuse continued, with offenders travelling between
cities to re-abuse them. Initiatives with care homes
might reduce repeat victimization (‘increasing
effort’).
Not only was friendship the major link, but
interview data showed victims were more vocal
about their friends’ abuse than their own.
Initiatives which enable girls to report each other’s
abuse might prove fruitful (‘increasing perceived
risk’).
Practical applications of SNA
We believe that the existing application of SNA
could be usefully extended across the following
four areas: frontline policing; strategic policing;
prosecution; and policy and research.
Frontline policing
To be of tactical value, networks are best con-
structed in parallel with live operations, rather
than once operations have concluded. They are
dynamic: as new material emerges, they can be
enriched and metrics re-run. Collaboration is key
between ofﬁcers who collect and process crucial
data and analysts who build and analyse networks.
NGOs and children’s service providers could con-
tribute supplementary material to enhance
networks.
SNA could be further advanced by including the
possession or ﬂow of goods, e.g. money or drugs
on networks, possible on existing software. For
trafﬁcking charges, an aggravating factor is the
large-scale commercial exploitation of victims,
demonstrable through clearly documented cash
ﬂows. Such inclusions might emphasize the orga-
nized crime aspects of ICST, thereby winning in-
vestigative funding.
Strategic policing
Senior ofﬁcers might commission networks which
go beyond offenders and victims to include critical
third parties, about whom very little is currently
known. Two examples are facilitators and clients.
Facilitators enable ICST by turning a blind eye to
suspicious circumstances, e.g. by allowing older
men accompanied by (unrelated, often inebriated)
young girls to buy alcohol or check in to hotels.
Their behaviour gives perpetrators access to
offence-related commodities and tacitly signals
that ICST is permissible. Clients, in contrast,
actively fuel ICST. Although not every individual
offence was proﬁt-led, many victims were pimped
out at times. It remains unclear whether ICST cli-
ents actively prefer underage girls, or are driven by
availability and price considerations. Our interview
data showed, for example, that vaginal sex cost ap-
proximately £40: well below the market rate for
non-trafﬁcked adult prostitutes (Monzini, 2000).
If these actors were included in SNA, it would be
possible to explore new territory and identify alter-
native avenues for intervention.
At national level, ofﬁcers could revolutionize the
knowledge-base on criminal networks in general.
Although we focused on ICST, SNA is useful for
6 Based on our stakeholder interviews conducted February–August 2010.
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 any networked crime. A national police network
database could be created as a repository for SNA
data gathered by individual operations, subdivided
by crime type. Relevant data might include charts,
centrality scores, key ﬁndings, records of successful
interventions, etc. Academics could be enlisted to
establish baseline scores for centrality metrics and
create a typology of networks. Once developed,
such a resource could support new operations, by
identifying from early data which type of network
was present and potentially effective interventions.
This database would necessarily be dynamic, so re-
sults should be re-evaluated at set intervals to
ensure the material remained current.
Prosecution
ICST cases are difﬁcult to prosecute, not least be-
cause of the huge volume of actors and victim cred-
ibility issues. If admissible under the laws of
evidence, network charts and associated metrics
might prove useful evidentiary aids. They could
be presented to jurors to underline the organized
nature of ICST or to emphasize the centrality of key
perpetrators.
Policy and Research
As well as contributing to the national police net-
work database discussed above, academics might
explore ways of tailoring SNA to policing needs.
One important example might be to explore ways
of creating a single optimum composite metric to
replace the three separate metrics discussed here,
thereby saving valuable police time. While police
focus on actual operation-speciﬁc networks,
academics and policy-makers might explore rea-
sons why networks develop, to inform early inter-
ventions aimed at preventing or disrupting
networks’ formation. Another critical area for at-
tention is male-victim ICST and whether its net-
work structures differ from the female-victim
version of ICST analysed here. Local and national
NGOs currently support male ICST victims and the
sexual exploitation of boys is believed to be a vastly
under-estimatedproblem(Barnardo’s,2011).Until
more is known about male-victim ICST, it will
remain unclear whether separate counter-strategies
are required.
Conclusion
Police have long used networks in investigations to
understand how suspects are interlinked. We have
shownhownetworksneednotbelimitedtooffend-
ers and that victim networks can prove useful too.
Our study has demonstrated that more advanced
SNA is possible at no extra cost. Existing data and
software can be exploited in a more systematic and
analytical manner to yield new insights. Results
from SNA need not be addressed in isolation, but
rather can complement and supplement ﬁndings
from other sources, in a form of multi-method
approach.
SNA is a valuable tool for supporting policing in
several ways. First, it can guide investigative strate-
gies and suggest targets for disruption or enforce-
ment. Second, it can encourage an open-minded
approach and counterbalance personal biases or as-
sumptions based on prior experience, of individ-
uals or of other operations. Third, it can identify
areas of importance, such as ‘girlfriends’, which lie
beyond the immediate police remit, highlighting
areasformulti-agencycollaboration.ICSTisclearly
a concern not just for the police and ‘[c]ross-
cutting problems require cross-cutting solutions’
(Stephenson, 2008). And ﬁnally, it can inform pro-
active interventions aimed at tackling ICST in a
range of ways. ICST is a complicated and long-
standing issue, well-suited to problem-oriented or
intelligence-led approaches which recognize how
preventive interventions can support ‘smart en-
forcement’ (Tilley, 2009). Nonetheless, it is crucial
to remember that SNA is a useful framework for
analysis, rather than a ‘one-stop-shop’ for answers.
Ultimately, SNA can support experience and cre-
ative problem-solving, but it cannot be a substitute
for them.
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